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报告题目：Declare or Commit? Pre-Announcing Contributions to a Public Good

报告时间：2026年11月5日（周四）下午15:00

报告地点：旭日楼306室

报告人：Jaimie W. Lien教授

报告人简介：

Jaimie W. Lien，山东大学经济研究院教授、博士生导师；山东大学特聘教授、山东大学理论与实验经济学研究中心（CREATE）联席主任；获国家自然科学基金委外籍优秀青年学者项目资助。美国卫尔斯利女子51视频 学士，美国加利福尼亚大学圣地亚哥分校硕士、博士。担任多份国际学术期刊客座编辑与编委成员。

研究领域包括行为经济学、实验经济学、应用微观经济学，研究主题涉及合作互惠、参照依赖、现时偏误、代表性偏误等重要行为现象。先后主持过国家自然科学基金项目、教育部科研项目、香港研究资助局项目。目前已有论文发表于Nature Communications、PNAS、American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)、Economic Journal、Games and Economic Behavior等国际知名期刊。

摘要：We introduce a voluntary commitment mechanism for public goods provision which is highly effective in the laboratory, and can be considered for implementation in problems such as climate agreements. We study a 2x2 design of treatments varying by whether players have to commit to or merely declare their contributions (declare vs. commit), and whether the declaration/commitment is at the individual or group level (individual vs. group). We find that declarations alone are ineffective, and that there is no relationship between individuals’ declarations and contributions, resulting in poor outcomes. In the Individual Commitment treatment, while subjects adhere to their commitments, the overall commitment level is low. In all of these treatments, payoffs are decreasing in contributions made, and a substantial static norm of zero contributions develops. Only the Group Commitment treatment succeeds in achieving an increasing pattern of commitment and contributions, and converges rapidly to a predominant norm of full contributions.